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CRIMINOLOGY
MANDATORY PRISON SENTENCES: THEIR PROJECTED EFFECTS ON CRIME
AND PRISON POPULATIONS*
JOAN PETERSILIA** AND PETER W. GREENWOODt
INTRODUCTION
Reform of sentencing statutes has recently
emerged as a major issue of national debate. New
legislation is being considered at both federal and
state levels to modify criminal proceedings, partic-
ularly sentencing. At the beginning of 1977, the
federal government and the legislatures of thirty
states were contemplating major revisions of their
criminal codes.'
Two concerns have apparently prompted this
interest in sentencing reform. First, criminologists,
legal scholars and political leaders have expressed
discontent with excessive disparities in the sen-
tences imposed and served under present statutes.
It has been repeatedly shown that persons of similar
criminal history convicted of similar crimes are
treated differently by the courts. For example, the
average prison sentence for persons convicted of
bank robbery is eleven years nationwide, but five
and one-half years in the Northern District of
Illinois and seventeen years in Georgia. 2 Much of
the blame for the disparity has been placed on the
wide latitude allowed judges under current sen-
* This paper was prepared under Grant Number 77-
NI-99-0053 from the National Institute of Law Enforce-
ment and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of
view or opinions stated in this document are those of the
authors and do not necessarily represent the official
position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
The authors wish to thank Hans Zeisel, James Q. Wilson,
Daniel Glaser and Jan Chaiken for reviewing an earlier
draft of this article.
** Joan Petersilia is a Research Associate in the Rand
Criminal Justice Program, and is the coauthor of CRIMI-
NAL CAREERS OF HABITUAL FELONS (1978) and THE CRIM-
INAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS (1977).
t Peter Greenwood is the Director of the Rand Crim-
inal Justice Program, and coauthor of CRIMINAL CAREERS
OF HABITUAL FELONS (1978), THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGA-
TION PROCESS (1977) and PROSECUTION OF ADULT FELONY
DEFENDANTS (1976).
'Compiled from a recent, unpublished survey con-
ducted by the Rand Corporation in 1977.
'CRIME CONTROL DIGEST, June 13, 1977, at 3.
tencing statutes. In addition to obvious jurisdic-
tional differences, some empirical evidence suggests
that a significant part of the disparity reflects
judicial prejudice, conscious or subconscious. For
example, a study of sentences for larceny and
assault disclosed that in state courts 74% of the
blacks convicted of larceny were sentenced to
prison, while only 49% of the whites with similar
records were imprisoned. Many criminologists
have called for substantial changes in sentencing
on the grounds that the current practice is grossly
inequitable.
Second, there is mounting public distress over
not only the high rate of violent crimes but also
over the rise in property crimes. Encouraged by the
mass media, the public has begun to blame judicial
leniency for the high level of such crime. Many
citizens believe that a "get tough" policy in the
courtroom would (1) help protect them against
serious criminals by imprisoning such persons for
longer periods, and (2) deter other persons from
crime because of the harsher sentences they would
expect to receive if caught. This notion exists not
only in the popular realm but it is also advanced
by respected law enforcement personnel. For in-
stance, former U.S. Attorney General Edward H.
Levi recently cited the failure of the courts to
imprison enough criminals as a primary reason for
rising crime rates.4
Many advocates of reform are convinced that
more certain, more widely publicized and more
.severe prison sentences for serious offenders will
enhance public protection. They cite recent empir-
ical evidence that most serious crime is committed
by repeaters -and that these recidivists, although
repeatedly arrested and convicted for serious
crimes, are not consistently imprisoned. Statistics
compiled by the Rand Corporation reveal that
3 ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF THE U. S. COURTS, FED-
ERAL OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES DisrRiar COURTS
77 (1971).
" BOSTON EVENING GLOBE, Sept. 16, 1975, at 4.
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60% of those arrested for robbery have a prior
felony conviction, but only 48% of those with a
prior conviction are sentenced to prison.5
Because of the low probability of incarceration
after conviction, many experts believe that the
growth of crime can be substantially explained by
the fact that, given our present use of sanctions,
"crime pays." Therefore, an object of any new
sentencing scheme must be to raise the "costs" of
committing crime. If offenders were certain tl.at
they would surely receive a prison sentence if con-
victed for a serious offense, some might judge the
penalty too great to risk. In fact, every empirical
study relating the certainty of imprisonment to the
crime rate has shown that the higher the probabil-
ity of imprisonment for a major offense, the lower
the rate for that offense 6
Even if the deterrent effect failed to reduce
crime, increasing the proportion of offenders who
go to prison should reduce the level of crime be-
cause more offenders would be unable to commit
crimes while imprisoned. Researchers have recently
begun to estimate the probable reduction in crime
if a larger proportion of convicted felons were
imprisoned. The estimates vary widely depending
on the assumptions made. For instance, it has been
suggested that the rate of violent crimes could be
reduced by as much as 80% if every person con-
victed of a violent crime were imprisoned for five
years.7 But another study has concluded that "in-
capacitation makes only a small and modest im-
pact on the violent crime rate; a 4.0 percent drop
is the highest estimate obtained in this re-
search."8 Regardless of the continuing debate over
how crime might be reduced by incapacitation, it
appears inevitable that policymakers will alterstate
sentencing codes in the hope of assuring more
certain and equal justice. If this alteration also
reduces crime, so much the better.
Two major reform proposals designed to limit
the latitude of sentencing judges are receiving se-
5 Based on an analysis of the 1973 California Offender
Based Transactional System arrest file, maintained by
the California Bureau of Statistics.
6Tittle & Rowe, Certainty of Arrest and Crime Rates, 5-
Soc. FORCEs 455 (1974); Tullock, Does Ihniment Deter
Crime? 36 PuB. INTRmr 103 (1974). Although these
findings are not inconsistent with deterrence theory, ther
are other possible explanations for these effects that
cannot be sorted out with the data currently available.
7 Shinnar & Shinnar, The Effects of the Criminaljustice
System on the Control of Crime A Ojantitatire Appmada, 9 LAw
& Soc'y REv., 581, 605 (1975).
8 Van Dine, Dinitz & Conrad, The Irapacitation of the
Dangerous Offeder. A Statistical Exp iment, 14 J. Rasxic
CRIME & DELNQUENCY 22,31 (1977).
rious attention. In the first proposal, called "flat-
time sentencing," the legislature sets a specific
sentence for each crime, or degree of crime, to be
imposed by the judge and served in full, although
reductions for "good behavior" are possible. The
second proposal is called the "mandatory-mini-
mum' sentence and it requires that a minimum
period of incarceration be served. The mandatory-
minimum scheme appears to be the more popular
of the two. During the Ninety-fourth Congress
alone (1975-76), more than thirty separate bills or
resolutions calling for mandatory-minimum sen-
tences were introduced. Several'states, including
Massachusetts and Connecticut, have already en-
acted statutes requiring mandatory-minimum
prison sentences for conviction of certain offenses.
Most of the state reform proposals limit the
mandatory sentencing to specified crimes or cate-
gories of criminals. The most common category is
the repeat criminal because of the general belief
that the greater number of crimes an offender
commits, the more severe his sentence should be.
Some states begin mandatory sentencing with the
second offense,9 while others begin it at the third'0
or fourth." Other states have abandoned the
"quantity of convictions" punishment principle by
focusing on particularly dangerous aspects of a
crime, such as the use of a weapon, 2 while a final
group combines the two philosophies and looks for
repetition of more violent crimes.'3 Whether the
prior offense need be a felony or a lesser crime is
another point of variation." Similarly, the age of
the defendant at the titne of the prior offense 5 and
the time span between offenses' 6 are treated differ-
ently in various states.'
7
If these reforms are instituted, more criminals
9 E g., N.Y. PENAL LAw (McKinney 1975) § 70.06.
'
0 Eg., Cowo. REv. STAT.§ § 16-13-101 (1973).
'Eg., VT. STAT. As. tit. 13, § 11 (1974).
'
2 MAss. ANN. LAws. eh 265, § 18B (Michie/Law. Co-
op Supp. 1978).
UjFg., S.C. CODE 17-25-40 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN.
§40-2801 et req. (1975).
' Eg., MAss GrE. LAws ANN. ch. 279, § 25 (West
1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 556.280, 290 (Vernon Supp.
1975).
5 Compare Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.080 (Baldwin
1975) (over eighteen) with OR. REv. STAT. § 161.725
(1975) (sixteen).
'
6 Compare LA. Rav. STAT. § 15.529.1 (West 1967)
(convictions cannot have occured more than five years
after the maximum sentence for the previous conviction
has expired) with Munm STAT. ANN. § 609.155 (West 1964)
(convictions cannot be more than ten years apart). -
17Se Note, 45 FoymNntAm L REV. 76 (1976), for further
discussion of the above statutes.
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will undoubtedly be sent to prison. However, since
many state prisons are now filled close to capacity,
many prison facilities would probably have to be
enlarged. Greater prosecutorial and investigatory
resources will likely be required in a system with
less plea bargaining and more severe sentences.
Thus, the proposed sentencing reform implies
greater system costs. It is imperative, therefore, that
such reforms be preceded by an evaluation of the
potential benefits in reduced crime that would
offset these increased costs. Specifically, we must
determine how much crime is prevented by impos-
ing sentences of varying length on specific classes
of offenders and must predict the impact that
mandatory penalties will have on the prison pop-
ulation. This article attempts to do both.
DATA BASE FOR THIS STUDY
We obtained data on a random sample of de-
fendants convicted of serious offenses over a two-
year period in the Denver, Colorado District
Court.' 8 The sample population consists of 625
persons who were convicted between mid-1968 and
mid-1970 of burglary, robbery, rape, aggravated
assault, homicide, auto theft, selling drugs and
grand larceny. The sample represents 42% of the
population available for study.
For each person in the sample, information was
collected on personal characteristics, prior criminal
record, court disposition of the current offense, and
recidivism during a two year follow-up period. All
of the data were obtained from secondary sources,
that is, the various criminal justice records. These
records included probation files for personal char-
acteristics, district court files for the status of cur-
rent cases and final court disposition, parole files
for the length of time served on prison sentence
and the recidivism rates of those released from
prison, and police department files for rearrest and
reconviction rates.
The collection of data was completed in March
1974; thus four to six years had elapsed since the
time of the conviction that placed a person into the
sample.
Property-related offenses were the most common
type of crime committed by persons in the sample.
Over one-third were prosecuted for burglary and
another 20% for robbery. About 19% of the sample
1 The data were originally collected for the Denver
High Impact Anti-Crime Program, reported in Charac-
teristics and Recidivism of Adult Felony Offenders in
Denver (1974). We are grateful to John Carr for giving
us access to this data base.
members were charged with assaultive acts, and
another 10% with drug offenses. The remaining
18% of the sample were charged with theft (includ-
ing auto theft) or miscellaneous offenses. Of the
625 convicted persons, 78.9% were found guilty as
charged; 17.8% were guilty of a lesser offense; 1%
were guilty of a more serious offense; and 2.2%
unknown. The average age of the sample was
twenty-six years. Other characteristics are pre-
sented in the next section.
CRIME-REDUCTION EFFECTS
In attempting to estimate the effect that man-
datory minimum prison sentences would have on
the adult crime rate, we focused on the following
questions:
Crime-Reduction Potential. If defendants convicted of
certain felonies were given mandatory prison sen-
tences, how much would the overall crime rate be
reduced? The violent crime rate? The burglary rate?
Optimal Length of Confinement How long a
sentence-one, three, five, more than five years-is
necessary to reduce significantly the overall level of
crime? The violent crime rate? The burglary rate?
Optimal "Target Population". Relying on official crim-
inal justice records, which characteristics define sub-
populations of offenders for whom an incapacitation
policy would be justified?
In projecting the impact of a particular man-
datory-minimum sentence policy, we assumed that
all convicted defendants who meet the criteria
specified by the policy will receive at least the
mandatory-minimum term. Those who received
longer terms in the past will continue to receive
longer terms in the future. Moreover, when esti-
mating incapacitation effects, we counted only
those prevented crimes that are attributable to the
extra incarceration time that results from the man-
datory-minimum term. We did not include inca-
pacitation effects attributable to sentences that
would have been imposed in the absence of a
mandatory-minimum policy.
METHODOLOGY
Two analytic techniques have been developed
for estimating the incapacitative effects of alter-
native sentencing policies. The first, a modeling
approach, uses some form of mathematical model
to estimate the relationship between sanctions and
crime rates. Parameters for these models, such as
individual crime or arrest rates, are logically de-
rived from aggregate data. Analyses using this
(Vol. 69
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approach have been reported by Clarke,19 Green-
berg,20 Shinnar and Shinnar,21 and Ehrlich,2 and
have been critically analyzed by Cohen.23 While
Clarke, Greenberg and Ehrlich all conclude that
incapacitation effects are quite small, Shinnar and
Shinnar claim to demonstrate that they are sub-
stantial. In her review of these different models,
Cohen demonstrates that they all lead to similar
conclusions if similar estimates of the parameters
describing the offender population are used. Ap-
proximately a 5% increase in prison population is
required to achieve a 1% reduction in crime.
The second approach, which is the one adopted
in this study, relies on career histories to estimate
the probable incapacitation effects if offenders had
been sentenced differently in the past. The proce-
dure takes a cohort of arrested or convicted offend-
ers, examines their past convictions and determines
case by case whether each offender would have
been imprisoned at the time of his current offense
if the sentencing policy being examined had been
applied at the time of his last conviction.u This is
the technique used by Van Dine and his colleagues
to support their conclusion that incapacitation
strategies, even when the sentences considered are
severe, have a modest impact on violent crime2 5
For our analysis, we proceeded as follows:
1. The sample was divided into three "offense co-
horts" based on the offense with which they were
19 Clarke, Getting 'Em Out of Circulation: Does Incarceration
ofjuvenile Offenders Reduce Crime? 65 J. CRIU. L. & C. 528
(1974).
' Greenberg, The Intcapacitative Effect of Imprisonment:
Some Estimates, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 541 (1975).
21 Shinnar, supra note 7, at 581.
' Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activities: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 81 J. PoL ECON. 521 (1973); reprinted in
ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNIsHMENT 68
(1974).
' Cohen, The Incapacitative Effect of Imprisonment: A Crit-
ical Review of the Literature, in DETEReNcE AND INCAPACI-
TATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCriONS
ON CRIME RATES 187 (1978).
2 We will sometimes speak of preventing the "cohorts'
crimes." Those crimes reflect the offenses for which the
defendants were originally charged-although approxi-
mately 20 percent did not result in conviction. It is
assumed that persons in the cohort, whether found guilty
or not, did in fact commit the charged crime. Thus, a
person officially charged with burglary who was con-
victed of grand theft is assumed to have committed the
burglary. If he had been given a mandatory prison
sentence on his immediately preceding conviction of a
felony, the resulting imprisonment was counted as having
prevented the burglary.
2 Van Dine, supra note 8, at 29.
officially charged in the 1968-1970 period:
Violent: offenders charged with robbery, rape,
aggravated assault, homicide, and kidnap-
ping.
Burglay: offenders charged with burglary.
Other Felonies: offenders charged with auto theft,
drug offenses, grand larceny, forgery, and
miscellaneous offenses.
2. Each offender's criminal record was examined to
determine whether he fell into. one of several
subgroups of interest. For example, did he have
one, two, or three or more prior adult felony
convictions? Did he have any prior adult convic-
tions for violent crimes?
3. For each offender, the time interval between the
immediately preceding adult felony conviction
and the arrest date for the current crime was
determined.
4. Several possible sentencing options were hypo-
thetically applied to the defendant's immediately
preceding conviction. For example, every person
convicted of a robbery who had at least one prior
adult conviction was hypothetically given a one-
year mandatory prison term for the prior convic-
tion. Then we ascertained whether or not these
offenders would have been in prison at the time
of their current offense. If so, the current offense
was counted as having been prevented by that
sentencing policy.
The diagram below illustrates the analytic tech-
nique employed for an offender convicted of rob-
bery on January 1, 1966, and January 1, 1967, and

















This offender's 1969 robbery would be counted as
not having been prevented by the 1-year sentence
but having been prevented by a 3- or 5-year sen-
tence since he would have been in prison on April
I, 1969!7
' We sometimes refer to the sample as a whole as the
all-felonies cohort.
'7 For those defendants with more than one prior
conviction, as in the example above, we focused only on
the most recent prior conviction. However, if the man-
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SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
In dividing the sample into cohorts based upon
the charge of their current crime, we might expect
that the persons in the cohorts would differ signifi- o
cantly with respect to prior criminal record or court
disposition of the current offense. Tables I and 2
show the criminal history and disposition of the c E
case for each offense cohort. The tables show that 1 c q ,
the average offender in the burglary cohort was -'<
slightly younger than his counterpart in the other
cohorts; that the "other felonies" cohort was .
slightly more likely to have a adult record, proba- .) g . o
bly because it was the oldest group; and that the < t-
violent cohort received the most severe sentencing "
treatment by the courts. The other differences were '-
insignificant.. - -




We measured the extent that the violent cohort's -*. _
crimes would have been prevented by the imposi- C < -
tion of mandatory prison sentences for their pre- -
ceding adult felony conviction. Seven hypothetical
sentencing policies were considered: co- -In o -C
<0
Sentencing Option I: Each offender convicted of an 1 Z-u
adult felony, violent or not, is sentenced to a 0 c-V
mandatory prison term of one, three, or five L%0
years. 
<
Sentencing Option II: Each offender convicted of an -
adult felony whose criminal record shows at least 0 -t- i -- 'i
one previous adult conviction is sentenced to a -
mandatory prison term of one, three, or five <
years on each conviction after the first. On the E, -
first adult conviction the penalty structure re- C) 1 E E 2.
mains as under present law. ,t <
EC
Sentencing Option III: Each offender convicted of an 0c
adult felony whose criminal record shows at least cq -0
two previous adult convictions is sentenced to a 0
mandatory prison sentence of one, three, or five -,
years after the second conviction. On the first - 0-,. - .5
two convictions the penalty structure remains as j .. -0 -c 'a
under present law.
Sentencing Option IV.- Each offender convicted of a ' ._ _ _
violent felony is sentenced to a mandatory prison 0 ", -R
term of one, three, or five years. .
. 0 C) u u C)
datory-minimum policy had been in effect over the de- ".R ,C7C)-
fendant's whole career, the second prior conviction might -U w
have been prevented by a sentence imposed on the first
prior conviction. Thus our simplification will result in a
slightly inflated estimate of the true incapacitation effect.
[Vol. 69
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Sentencing Option V." Each offender convicted of a
violent felony whose criminal record shows at
least one previous adult conviction (not neces-
sarily for a violent crime) is sentenced to a
mandatory prison term of one, three, or five
years after the first conviction. On the first adult
conviction the penalty structure remains as un-
der present law.
Sentencing Option VI: Each offender convicted of a
violent felony whose criminal record shows at
least two previous adult convictions (not neces-
sarily for violent crimes) is sentenced to a man-
datory prison term of one, three, or five years
after the second conviction. On the first two
convictions the penalty structure remains as un-
der present law.
Sentencing Option VII: Each offender convicted of a
violent felony whose criminal record shows at
least one previous adult conviction for a violent
crime is sentenced to a mandatory prison term
of one, three, or five years after the first convic-
tion. On the first adult conviction the penalty
structure remains as under present law.
Figure 1 shows the percentage of the violent
cohort's offenses that would have been prevented
if the offender had been sentenced alternatively
under each of the seven mandatory sentencing
options for his immediately preceding felony con-
viction.
Under option I, 10.9% of the cohort would have
been prevented from committing their violent of-
fense in the 1968-1970 period by a one-year man-
datory prison sentence; 22.2% would have been
prevented by a three-year sentence, and 31% by a
TABLE 2
DISPOSmON OF CURRENT OFFENSE, BY COHORT
Cohort Percentage of Specified Cohort Av. Length of Incar-
ceration (years)*
Convicted on Given Given Given Given Given
Cohort Charges Probation Jail Reformatory Prison Other
Violent 96 27 9 25 36 2.5 1.3
Burglary 69 28 8 34 25 4 1.1
Other felonies 71 6 25 32 28 8 .9
All felonies 79 22 13 32 30 4 1.1
'These averages represent a combination of the percentage of persons who were convicted but did not serve any
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FIGURE 1
Percentage of violent cohiort offenses prevented by mandatory sentencing options
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five-year sentence. The data suggest that the inci-
dence of violent crime might be lessened by one-
third if every adult defendant convicted of a felony,
regardless of prior record, were imprisoned for a
period of five years. The maximum crime reduction
effect possible under such a sentencing scheme is
40%. The "> 5 years" category on each of the
graphs can be interpreted as the maximum benefit
derived under the different policies.
The less stringent sentencing options, options II
through VII, impose mandatory prison sentences
only on defendants whose criminal records contain
previous adult convictions. For example, option II
mandates imprisonment for persons previously
convicted of at least one adult felony; under this
option, a five-year sentence would have prevented
15.8% of the violent offenses.
Even more restrictive sentencing options-for
example, those that require the defendant to pos-
sess two priors or have convictions for violent of-
fenses-prevent many fewer crimes. Such policies,
even with a five-year imprisonment, reduced the
violent crimes of the cohort by less than seven
percent.
On the surface, these data tell us only that a
certain percentage of the crimes for which the
members of this cohort were officially charged
would have been prevented by a particular man-
datory-minimum sentence. Given the existing low
rates of crime clearance and conviction, this num-
ber represents a very small proportion of the total
adult crime reported in a given period. However,
the use of this small percentage as a measure of
incapacitation implicitly assumes that each of the
offenders in the sample committed only one
crime-the crime for which he was officially
charged. It further assumes that other active of-
fenders, not arrested during the two-year period in
question, did not experience earlier convictions
that would have resulted in their incapacitation
during the period.8s The use of these extremely
conservative assumptions clearly leads to a large
downward bias in the resulting incapacitation es-
timates.
A more appropriate assumption would be that
the offenders in this sample represent a random
2' In other words, if we use only the crimes for which
the offenders in our sample were convicted as a measure
of incapacitation, we would be ignoring the crimes of
defendants who were released and not subsequently con-
victed during the period (i.e., the "successful" offender).
Given the low probability of arrest and conviction for
property crimes, there is reason to believe that their
number is substantial.
sample, in terms of prior record characteristics, of
all offenders who were criminally active during the
period of the study. In other words, if 30% of our
sample have prior felony convictions, we assume
that 30% of the crimes which were not cleared by
arrest were also committed by offenders with prior
felony convictions.
Theoretically, there are two reasons to suspect
that a random sample of persons arrested or con-
victed is not truly representative of all persons who
are engaged in crime in a particular period. On the
one hand, any random group selected on the basis
of an arrest or conviction will tend to overrepresent
offenders with higher crime rates; by definition
they have a greater likelihood of entering the sam-
ple. This biasing effect would tend to make the
"random sample" assumption conservative, over-
representing the high-rate offender. On the other
hand, we know that arrestees and convicted persons
overrepresent the offenders who commit crimes
against victims who can identify them and who
therefore have a higher probability of arrest.2 This
bias would tend to make the "random sample"
assumption too liberal, in overrepresenting the less
sophisticated offender. Since the available evidence
is inadequate for sorting out these two conflicting
effects, we cannot be sure in which way the final
estimate will be biased. Yet, the "random sample"
assumption appears to provide a more reasonable
basis for interpreting those results than any other
assumption that we can make at this time.
In the rest of this article we will adopt the
"random sample" assumption and will refer to the
percentage of cohort crimes prevented as the per-
centage of all reported crimes prevented. Also, in
the model adopted here, there are no assumptions
concerning the criminal lifetime of offenders or of
a Poisson process for crime commissions, as in most
studies of incapacitation effects.
The Burglary Cohort
The sentencing schemes applied to the burglary
cohort resembled those imposed on the violent
cohort. Options I, II, and III were identical; options
IV, V, and VI substitute burglary convictions for
violent convictions as follows:
Sentencing Option IV. Each offender convicted of a
burglary is sentenced to a mandatory prison
term of one, three, or five years.
2 See VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, FELONY ARRESTS:




Sentencing Option V- Each offender convicted of a
burglary whose criminal record shows at least
one previous adult conviction (not necessarily
for burglary) is sentenced to a mandatory prison
term of one, three, or five years after the first
conviction. On the first adult conviction the
penalty structure remains as under present law.
Sentencing Option VI: Each offender convicted of a
burglary whose criminal record shows at least
two previous adult convictions (not necessarily
for burglary) is sentenced to a mandatory prison
term of one, three, or five years after the second
conviction. On the first two convictions the pen-
alty structure remains as under present law.
No option VII was applied to the burglary cohort.
Figure 2 shows the percentage of the 1968-1970
burglary cohort offenses that would have been
prevented by each of the six mandatory sentencing
schemes. Comparison of the effects of the identical
options I, II, and III in Figures 1 and 2 suggests
that mandatory sentencing may have greater po-
tential for reducing the incidence of burglary than
of violent crimes.
Under option I, 42% of the offenders in the
burglary cohort would have been prevented from
committing their current burglaries if they had
been imprisoned five years for their last adult
felony conviction; 31% would have been prevented
by a three-year imprisonment; 14% because of a
one-year imprisonment. The most stringent option
(option I, five-year imprisonment) would have pre-
vented nearly one-half of the burglaries.
Option II, which limits mandatory prison sen-
tences to offenders with at least one prior adult
felony conviction, would have prevented few bur-
glaries with one- or three-year imprisonments (1.9%
and 8.5%, respectively). Options IV-VI, which are
more conservative, also would have prevented only
a few of the burglaries (approximately 1-12%).
Entire Sample
Figure 3 presents the percentage of all 1968-1970
felonies that would have been prevented if man-
datory prison sentences had been imposed under
options I, II, and III for the defendants' immedi-
ately preceding adult conviction.
It has been suggested that every person convicted
of a serious felony should receive some imprison-
ment. Sentencing option I measures"the number of
the entire sample's crime that would have been
prevented under this principle. In applying the
most stringent form of this option (sentencing every
person convicted of a felony to five years' imprison-
ment), we found that only 45% of the crimes
committed by our sample would have been pre-
vented. Option II, which sentences only persons
previously convicted of an adult felony to five years
[(any felony)
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FIGURE 2
Percentage of burglary cohort offenses prevented by mandatory sentencing options





X 30 II (any felony, I prior)
20





Percentage of entire sample's offenses prevented by mandatory sentencing options
in prison, would have prevented only 18% of the
crimes.
These results cause us to doubt that mandatory-
minimum sentences can easily reduce the crimes
committed by adults. To reduce the level of crime
in half, every person convicted of a felony, regard-
less of prior criminal history, would have to be
imprisoned for five years. If the length of imprison-
ment were three years, the crime level could be
reduced by a third; if it were one year, the reduc-
tion would be 15%. Moreover, to reduce violent
crime by one-third, every person convicted of a
robbery, rape, aggravated assault; homicide, and
kidnapping would have to be imprisoned for five
years. Even if violent offenders were imprisoned for
more than five years, violent crimes would only be
reduced by about 40%. Finally, the burglary rate
could be reduced by nearly half (42%) if all de-
fendants were imprisoned five years for their pre-
ceding adult conviction. With a three-year im-
prisonment, crime would be reduced by 31%.
Some may regard the policy of sentencing every
convicted person to prison as too harsh, since it
does not take into account the offender's prior
involvement in crime. However, these data suggest.
that if only defendants who have a prior adult
conviction are imprisoned, the crime-reduction ef-
fect would be just about one-half that of the re-
duction produced by sentencing every convicted
felon to prison. The crime reduction effects dis-
cussed here may not be-as large as one would have
expected. But, it must be remembered that the
figures presented above represent only the effects
due to incapacitation and do not take into account
additional benefits resulting from deterrence or
rehabilitation. Additionally, the policies considered
deal only with adult sentencing, ignoring any al-
ternative policies aimed at juveniles.
EFFECT ON PRISON POPULATION
Before opting for sentencing reforms, policymak-
ers must weigh their projected benefits in crime
reduction against their likely costs in increased
prison population. Advocates of new mandatory
sentencing schemes have generally ignored the
likely extra burden on the correctional system. In
this section, we consider the effect that the hypo-
thetical sentencing options discussed in the preced-
ing section would have on the prison population.
30
30 For simplicity, we do not consider the total prison
population but only that deriving from our sample of
offenders. Our calculations measure the additional man-
years of p. *son time to be served by the offenders sampled.
For convenience, we translate these additional man-years
into increases in the prison population. This translation
assumes that enough time passes to achieve a new steady-
state prison population, and that the prior offense char-




Specifically, we estimate the percentage increase in
the prison population if every convicted felon in
the sample had been given a prison sentence of
one, three, and five years, and we predict the
percentage increase if every convicted felon with at
least one prior adult conviction had been given a
one, three, or five year prison sentence.
In projecting the impact of these mandatory
minimum policies on future prison populations,
one should take into account that some offenders
would have received sentences in excess of the
minimum mandated by the new policy. Therefore,
applying these mandatory sentences to them would
tend to reduce rather than increase the prison
population. We have made no attempt to predict
the "reduction" effect here. For the most part, the
effect would be minimal, as the hypothetical sen-
tences are considerably harsher than those nor-
mally imposed.
METHODOLOGY
To estimate the percentage increase in prison
population, we proceeded as follows:
1. For each hypothetical sentence (&g., all persons
convicted of a violent felony with one prior adult
conviction will receive a three-year sentence), we
distinguished three parts of the Denver sample:
Those offenders who did not qualify for the
sentence (not convicted of a violent felony
or had no prior record).
Those offenders who qualified for the sen-
tence but who were already sentenced to
terms longer than the mandatory-mini-
mum, and hence would be unaffected by
the new policy.
Those offenders who qualified for the sen-
tence, had currently received less than the
mandatory-minimum sentence, and who
would be assumed to serve exactly the man-
datory-minimum.
2. Members of the third group were the only ones
whose sentences would be increased under the
new mandatory-minimum policy. The total
(minimum) increase in time to be served by this
group is the difference between the mandatory
minimum and the average time now served (S
- T3), multiplied by the number of offenders in
the group (N3).
No attempt is made to distinguish between prison and
jail time. Since some mandatory prison terms would
result in a transfer of prisoners from jail to prison, the
actual percentage increase in prison population will be
larger than estimated. And since jails contain mostly
misdemeanants and detentioners awaiting trial, the ac-
tual increase in total incarcerated population will be less
than estimated.
3. The percentage increase in prison population
owing to the third group can be estimated as the
increase in time to be served (calculated in step
2), divided by the total time to be served by the
entire sample, i.e.,
(S - T)N3
T iNt + T2N2 + T.N.'
where S = mandatory minimum sentence
length
Ti = average time served by inmate
in group i
Ni = number of inmates in group i.
FINDINGS
Figure 4 shows the percentage increase in the
prison population if the entire sample, regardless
of prior criminal history, had been given a man-
datory minimum sentence of one, three, or five
years. The results are shown separately for those
convicted of a violent felony, burglary, and all
felonies. At the extreme, if every person convicted
of a felony had been sentenced to a minimum of
five years, the prison population would have in-
creased by 450%; if each were sentenced to a three-
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FIGURE 4
Increase in prison population with mandatory mini-
mum sentences for every convicted felon
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year minimum, a 230% prison increase would have
occurred; and if each were sentenced for only one
year, a 50% increase would have resulted.
If every person convicted of a burglary had been
sentenced to a minimum of five years, the prison
population would have risen by 150%; if each were
sentenced to three years, there would have been a
75% increase; and if each were sentenced for one
year, a 25% increase would have occurred. Finally,
if every person convicted of a violent felony had
been given a five-year mandatory minimum sen-
tence, the prison population would have risen by
160%; if each were given a three-year sentence,
there would have been an 80% increase; and if
each received a one year sentence, a 25% increase
would have resulted.
Figure 5 shows the impact of a more selective
policy, under which those who had been convicted
of at least one prior adult felony received manda-
tory prison sentences. As the figure shows, limiting
the mandatory-minimum sentence to persons pre-
viously convicted seems to be a more plausible
policy option because the impact on prison popu-
lations is more reasonable. If every person in the
sample who had at least one prior felony conviction
had been sentenced to one year in prison, the
prison population would have risen about 15%; if
each were sentenced to three years, an 80% increase
would have occurred; and if each were sentenced
to five years, there would have been about a 190%
increase.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICIATIONS
We have analyzed the impact of various man-




Increase in prison population with mandatory mini-
mum sentences for at least one prior conviction
and on the prison population. The results are
summarized in Figures 6 and 7 for the all-felonies
cohort and for the violent cohort respectively. In
Figure 6, the lower curve is generated by varying
the mandatory-minimum prison term (one year,
three years, five years) under sentencing Option I,
which imposes the mandatory-minimum term on
all convicted felons regardless of prior record. The
upper curve corresponds to Option II, which im-
poses the mandatory-minimum term (ofaltemative
100
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Effect on crime rate and prison population of sentenc-
ing options I and II and a range of mandatory minimum
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lengths) only on convicted felons- having at least
one prior felony conviction.
Figure 6 clearly reveals the trade-offs between
crime rate and prison population under the sen-
tencing alternatives considered. For example, the
crime rate would be reduced 15% (compared to
85% for the current level) and the prison popula-
tion would (eventually) increase 50% if every per-
son convicted of a felony were imprisoned for one
year (Option 1). To lower the crime rate by the
same 15 percent under Option II, it would be
necessary to impose a mandatory-minimum term
of approxiamtely four years on felons with a prior
conviction, which would raise the prison popula-
tion by 125%.
Figure 7, showing the relation between crime
rate and prison population for the violent cohort,
addresses four sentencing options. We see that the
more restrictive the prior-record condition that
defines the group to which the option applies, the
smaller its effect on crime rate. For example, a
three-year mandatory-minimum term produces a
22% reduction in crime rate under Option I, and
11% reduction under Option II, a 3% reduction
under Option IV and 1% reduction under Option
V-with the corresponding increases in'prison pop-
ulation being, respectively, 225, 87, 87, and 27%.
Contrast these results with those in Figure 6, which
showed that a three-year mandatory-minimum
term reduces the crime rate by 34% under Option
I and 12% under Option Il-while raising the
population 225 and 87%, respectively. -
This finding-that a better crime-reduction/
prison population trade-off would result from im-
prisoning all felons for a short period regardless of
prior record, may go against expectations that
crime could be most effectively controlled by con-
centration on the offenders with prior convictions.
At this time, we can only speculate as to why this
relationship is found. We know that under current
sentencing policies, convicted offenders are much
more likely to be sentenced to prison if they have
a prior criminal record. Within this sample, only
57% of those defendants convicted with no prior
record were incarcerated, while 90% of those with
prior records were incarcerated. We also know that
although the recidivism rate increases with any
prior record, this increase is minimal when com-
pared with the increase in likelihood of prison
commitment.
We have referred earlier to the disparity in the
sentences received by defendants with similar crim-
inal records, convicted of similar crimes. Some of
the disparity reflects the different philosophies held
by different judges. However, disparity is found in
the sentencing decisions of even a single judge.
With respect to a series of similar defendants con-
victed of similar crimes, he may give some defend-
ants a straight probation, others a prison term, and
still others a combination of probation and jail
time. In making his sentencing decisions, a judge
tries to assess the risk an offender will pose to the
community if he is not confined and the impact
that imprisonment would have on him and his
future behavior. In so doing, the judge avoids an
unjustly mechanical application of sentencing laws
based only on the convicted charges and prior
record.
For example, not all convicted armed robbers
with prior records receive a prison sentence. In
distinguishing the cases in which a prison term was
imposed from those in which it was not, we would
be likely to find systematic differences related to
the judge's appraisal of the risk to the community.
Those not sentenced to prison would have less
serious prior records or better family and commu-
nity ties, better employment records, etc., than
those given prison terms. If there is a positive
correlation between the risk estimated by thejudge
and the actual risk posed by the defendant, we
would expect to find that, on the average, defend-
ants with serious prior records who are not given
prison sentences have a lower recidivism rate than
those convicted of similar offenses with minor prior
records who are not given prison sentences. While
we cannot prove that the relationships hypothe-
sized above are in fact true, they are at least
consistent with the crime reduction prison popu-
lation curves in Figures 6 and 7 and they do deserve
attention in future studies.'
In summary, mandatory-minimum sentence pol-
icies can reduce crime through incapacitation ef-
fects, but substantial increases in prison popula-
tions will be required to achieve modest reductions
in adult crime. Our analysis indicates that for a
one percent reduction in crime, prison populations
must increase by three to ten percent, depending
on the target population to be sentenced. These
figures are consistent with the five to one ratio
estimated by Cohen in her review of other inca-
pacitative models.31 Our analysis suggests further
that mandatory-minimum sentencing policies that
focus only on defendants with prior records, al-
though they may accord better with the notion of
just deserts, are less efficient. Such policies result in
less crime reduction for a specified increase in
prison population than those policies that apply
regardless of prior record.
31 Cohen, supra note 23, at 188.
